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Policing UK Airports and Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000: the 
young passengers’ perception of security measures.  
 
Abstract 
Policing airports following 9/11 has been challenging with an emphasis on visibility and high 
levels of security checks for passengers.  The focus has been on a form of ‘reassurance 
policing’ and an emphasis on procedural justice which is accepted as legitimate on the part of 
the public. However, there have been claims that Muslim passengers are under greater 
suspicion than other passengers and have been subject to the practice of ‘racial profiling’. The 
powers under the Terrorism Act 2000, notably Schedule 7 have been under scrutiny as to the 
extent that they allow the police to stop and search suspects. This study reviews the opinions 
and experiences of young passengers at UK airports to see if they are reassured by policing 
and their opinions on profiling fellow passengers. 
Keywords: Terrorism, reassurance policing, procedural justice; profiling, aviation, 
passenger experience, security 
 
Introduction  
Since the events of 11th September 2001 (9/11), the visibility of policing has increased at UK 
airports in response to the perceived and actual threat of terrorism.  Passengers are subject 
to more prolonged security checks.  The visibility of patrolling police with firearms, police 
vehicles parked off-road and near roundabouts and of police stations at large airports, has it 
is argued, served as a reassurance to passengers and a deterrent to terrorists. These 
developments in so-called ‘reassurance policing’,1 have concurrently given legitimacy to exert 
greater police powers to this perceived risk.2 Additionally the security procedure that 
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passengers are subject to is increasingly demanding. Airport security concerning embarkation 
is twofold; the first phase is the electronic screening of passengers by metal detectors which 
can result in a pat-down by security if metal is detected or full-body scanning followed by a 
pat-down.  The second process is the potential of passengers being profiled stopped and 
screened by the police.  When disembarking, passengers are subject to immigration checks 
and possible police checks.  In both cases of these security checks, Schedule 7 of the 
Terrorism Act 2000 (TA 2000) is the legal instrument in the UK to determine whether the 
passenger is a potential or actual terrorist.  
Fundamental flaws in airport terminal security were highlighted with two nail bombing attacks 
in March 2016 at Brussels Airport in Zaventem (a third attack took place during this period at 
Maelbeek Metro station in Brussels). In these attacks, 31 victims and three suicide bombers 
were killed and 300 people were injured.3 These attacks exposed how easy it was to enter an 
airport departure area and detonate explosives.  Although the rationale for high visibility of 
policing is to prevent repeat offences of this nature and fortify public confidence and that of 
business,4 a major question is whether reassurance policing can really be a deterrent to 
committed terrorists.5 
The profiling of air passengers for stopping, questioning and a possible search has been 
employed since the introduction of security to prevent terrorist attacks on passenger flights in 
the 1970s,6 with profiling for potential hijackers and terrorists first occurring at Israeli airports.7   
Passenger behaviours, such as undertaking odd travel patterns, looking nervous, avoiding 
eye contact, sweating, displaying unusual behaviour, carrying suspicious documents, and the 
giving of unconvincing answers to reasonable questions are all worthy of further investigation.8 
However in general terms, before the events of 9/11 in New York, aviation security, 
investigation and possible intervention had focussed predominately on illegal activities such 
as contraband rather than terrorism.9 
Since 9/11, terrorist attacks and attempts on aviation in the west, have been carried out, 
predominately, but not exclusively, by male Muslims aged 18-35.10  Studies both in the United 
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Kingdom11 and in the United States12, have identified significant levels of concern within 
Muslim communities that they are being targeted at airports for additional searches and 
questioning. Ethnic or Racial profiling of this type in the U.S. and most western democracies 
has attracted considerable criticism as being immoral and likely to be unconstitutional and 
illegal.13 Airport security has impacted on ethnic minority travellers, particularly young male 
Muslims, who suggest they are treated as ‘others’ under a greater suspicion, primarily due to 
the media representation of the stereotypical radical and extremist terrorist.14 
The main argument put forward in support of racial profiling is a pragmatic one: since 9/11 
terrorists have been overwhelmingly young Muslim men, this group therefore should be 
targeted.15 However, the counter-argument is that the ineffectiveness of racial profiling does 
not justify its use and ferments malcontent within relevant communities and promotes 
radicalisation of individuals.16 The reality is that the main reason for passengers being stopped 
and questioned at airports is not due to the application of a racial profiling, but the more 
mundane factor that an individual’s hand luggage has triggered an alarm and warrants further 
investigation. Airport security since 9/11 has resulted in additional time needed to screen 
passengers in a sector that has dramatically increased in the numbers of air travellers. 
The current study addresses young passenger perceptions and reassurance of UK airport 
security and their opinions of profiling passengers for stop and search by utilizing an attitude 
survey conducted among 711 university students from 2012-2015.  One rational for using 
university students is that since 9/11 a large number of UK university students have either 
carried out terrorist attacks or supported such causes. However, given that security personal 
would be unlikely to know passenger status until stopped, the main rational was that these 
respondents were young passengers, who in this study were between 18-25. The aim of this 
study was to review the respondents’ views as to profiling passengers from different ethnic 
categories and the overall reassurance and support for airport security. The data supports the 
legitimacy of a high level of security to reassure passengers of safety.  However, when 
considering passenger perceptions of airport screening, particularly profiling, in the minority of 
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passengers who disagreed with profiling there was a significant difference between the views 
of white passengers and non-white passengers. This outcome of this study does not suggest 
the current legitimacy of UK airport security and regulatory framework is in need of wholesale 
change. One key proposal however is that procedural justice and legitimacy of the security 
process is embedded into the training of UK security officers to minimise passengers’ negative 
perceptions.  Additionally, when measuring this study against the Civil Aviation Authority 
(CAA) data, young passengers do take longer to process through UK airport security and this 
study offers a reason why that might be the case.  
This article will firstly outline the regulatory framework that is applicable to the security 
screening at UK airports. This includes an examination of the legal provisions under Schedule 
7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, which empowers the police and security officials to stop and 
search individuals due to security concerns. Secondly, it will be argued that this framework is 
primarily about reassurance policing or policing by consent. Thirdly, previous studies that have 
attempted to measure suspect communities and their encounters with authority that suggests 
the use and practice of racial profiling, will be examined. Fourthly, the findings of the current 
study of University students as to their attitudes towards the profiling of passengers will be 
presented. Lastly, the article will suggest reforms to aviation security and the legal framework 
that empowers police officers to question passengers either as a result of electronic screening 
or subject to Schedule 7 to determine whether the passenger is a terrorist.   
 
Schedule 7 Terrorism Act 2000: Policing and Security at airports 
 Schedule 7 of the TA 2000 applies to ports, which include both seaports and airports. The 
examining officer can be either a constable, immigration officer, or a customs officer 
designated by the Secretary of State.17 The examining officer can detain a passenger for a 
maximum of 6 hours for questioning18 and detain property for up to 7 days to help determine 
whether the passenger is a terrorist.19 However, unlike the requirements for stopping 
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suspected criminals in a public place, there is no need for the examining officer to have 
reasonable suspicion or grounds for believing the passenger is a terrorist at the point the 
passenger is stopped.20 Parliament has set the bar for the exercise of Schedule 7 powers 
quite low.21 Passengers who wilfully fail to comply or obstruct the examining officer can be 
liable for up to three-months imprisonment on summary conviction.22 Passengers travelling to 
and from the UK and Ireland can be asked to provide further information; this is known as 
‘carding’.23  Passengers who are examined for more than one hour, but not detained, will be 
issued with a ‘TACT 1 notice’, essentially meaning a receipt of the examination.   
Once detained, either because the suspect is non-co-operative, wants to leave during pre-
screening or the examining officer believes its necessary to detain the suspect, further 
detention is subject to the requirements of Schedule 8 TA 2000.  The suspect will be given a 
notice of detention form called ‘TACT 2’. Schedule 8 can require the suspect to undergo a 
number of checks, for example, finger prints, intimate and non-intimate samples to determine 
the identification of the passenger.24 Schedule 14 of the TA 2000 requires a code of practice 
to be issued to examining officers who use Schedule 7.  The Code for Examining Officers was 
first published in 2009.25 It outlined who should perform Schedule 7 stops, giving preference 
to police officers, save in exceptional circumstances. Selecting persons for screening should 
be based on the current threat of terrorism or informed considerations and not solely based 
on perceived ethnic background or religion. No official profiling programme exists to target 
ethnicity to prevent terrorism at airports or elsewhere.  The 2009 and 2014 Codes of Practice 
relating to the implementation of Schedule 7 clearly state that no one should be stopped and 
searched solely on the grounds of ethnicity.26   
There have been concerns over the extent of the powers under Schedule 7. In 2011, the 
former Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation (2011-2017), David Anderson,27 
suggested the provision was too intrusive and commented in his annual report, ‘I believe that 
a cautious rebalancing could be achieved without materially increasing the risk from 
terrorism.’28 This concern over the extensive powers under Schedule 7, together with 
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comments from the previous Independent Reviewer (2001-2011) Lord Carlile, are likely to 
have contributed to a public consultation to review the operation of Schedule 7 in September 
2012.29  The main response to this consultation was the publication of the 2014 Code of 
Practice (2014 Code).  This development was in the context of new legislation, namely the 
Anti-Social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014 (ASBCPA) that amended Schedule 7. 
One important change was that officers operating Schedule 7 must undergo training on the 
2014 Code.  The 2014 Code has set out the procedure for stopping suspects, screening and, 
if necessary, detention for further examination.  The 2014 Code concentrated on developing 
good practice, rather than legal requirements, to try and establish better safeguards and 
enhanced confidence for both the public and suspects in the process of screening by 
introducing some accountability for officers carrying out Schedule 7 stops.30 Consequently, in 
his 2015 report, Anderson appeared reassured and was minded to state that the statistics 
concerning Schedule 7 do not indicate it is being exercised in a discriminatory way.31  
Although the 2014 Code does not allow ethnicity to be the only reason for stopping someone, 
once stopped, a person can be questioned about their religious beliefs and activities within 
their religious community.  The relatively high number of persons stopped from certain ethnic 
backgrounds is evidence to suggest that the 2014 Code will be challenged to provide a fair 
system and application of Schedule 7.32 Lord Kerr dissenting in Beghal v DPP clearly identifies 
that Schedule 7 is not only likely to do so, but will discriminate against Muslims.  This view has 
not been shared by the majority of judges who have reviewed the use of Schedule 7. However, 
these concerns have clearly had an impact on Schedule 7 since they have been highlighted 
by the reduction in its use. In Anderson’s 2015 report, the statistics show that the use of 
Schedule 7 is decreasing.33  
The use of Schedule 7 is not without limits.  An illustration is the case of David Miranda, who 
was detained at Heathrow airport in 2013 for carrying files related to information contained on 
social networking servers and phone records of millions of U.S. customers obtained by the 
whistleblower, Edward Snowden. On appeal the decision was that Schedule 7, as in force at 
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the time of this incident, did not provide sufficient protection against the examination of 
journalistic material. Lord Dyson stated the stop power, if used in respect of journalistic 
information or material, is incompatible with article 10 [freedom of expression] of the European 
Convention on Human Rights because it is not ‘prescribed by law’.34  However, David 
Miranda’s examination by police under Schedule 7 was lawful and proportionate. 
Miranda revealed the extent of a new depth of surveillance by the US National Security Agency 
(NSA) and The Government Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) and at the same time    
provided publicity to Schedule 7 with concerns from some politicians as to how journalists 
were being treated.35  These factors are likely to ensure greater care from and responsibility 
for chief constables to ensure their officers who carry out their duties under Schedule 7 are 
acting within the parameters of the 2014 Code.    
The changes to Schedule 7 are intended to provide passengers with additional safeguards 
whilst at the same time setting out clear procedures for designated officers.  The legislative 
changes36 and the 2014 Code is designed to achieve this.37 Compulsory training for the use 
of Schedule 7 has become a mandatory requirement for designated officers.  It will be difficult 
to assess the success of the training for designated officers’ use of Schedule 7, given 
reasonable suspicion to stop and screen passengers or make records for the first hour is not 
required.  Designated officers will still have significant powers at ports and airports to stop and 
screen passengers for up to one hour without having to explaining to the passenger why 
she/he is being stopped.38 This may continue to produce a protracted and steady stream of 
complaints and accusations of racism from passengers who suffer both professional and 
unprofessional behaviours that cannot be monitored. Lowe states that the Schedule 7 powers 
are only used when necessary and should not be portrayed as the norm in how the state and 




These moderating changes to Schedule 7 can be seen as an element of ‘reassurance 
policing’. This, according to Innes, has now become a strategy adopted by many police forces 
where the strategy focuses on police visibility, targeting public order or low level theft offences 
or as Innes terms, ‘signal crimes’.40 Whilst these assertions are founded on policing in 
community neighbourhoods with the support of neighbourhood watch schemes and 
community officers, they nevertheless can usefully be applied to actions in UK airports to 
counter terrorist attacks.  This policing strategy has its origins in the notions of ‘policing by 
consent’, an historical and fundamental philosophical approach of British policing, with its roots 
in the ‘Nine Principles of Policing’ from the early nineteenth Century.41  One of these principles 
promotes the need: 
‘to recognise always that the power of the police to fulfil their functions and duties 
is dependent on public approval of their existence, actions and behaviour and on 
their ability to secure and maintain public respect’.42  
In terms of airport security in the UK, this manifest itself in terms of a bifurcated approach with 
the formal security process familiar to users of airports and the specific legal regime that 
empowers the police to intervene in certain circumstances, augmented with a visible presence 
of armed police officers. This has been justified on the basis of signalling a strong physical 
presence and reassurance to the public they are safe and acting as a deterrent to potential 
terrorist activity.43  The display of officers with firearms at airports is commensurate with the 
National Reassurance Policing Project, which claims that officers who appear visible, in this 
case with firearms, can give a degree of re-assurance to the public.44 The U.S. went further in 
the aftermath of 9/11 by employing armed air marshals on flights.  These officers would remain 
undercover, but passengers were informed of their presence.45    
This significantly increased visibility of security can be seen as largely symbolic and intended 
to re-assure the public. The legitimacy of the security officials and the police at airports draws 
upon procedural justice theory and psychological responses of the public to regulatory 
regimes. Within policing studies, this theory necessitates that perceptions of legitimacy on the 
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part of citizens’ subject to such regimes requires two components, firstly, effectiveness of 
police conduct and secondly, the engagement of the police with the public. As Brouwer et al 
argue: 
Experiencing fair treatment by the police is the strongest predictor of police legitimacy … 
procedural justice is usually seen to incorporate the fairness of the decisions made by 
officers and the quality of treatment during an interaction.46 
Simon however argues that 9/11 facilitated the adaptation of increased security processes in 
the search for effective strategies for terrorist prevention and exploited insecurities of 
passengers that challenges the reality of confidence in procedural justice.47 Together with 
legislative developments, traction has been given to airport operators and the police to 
implement a risk assessment programme at a higher level than might be necessary. This has 
facilitated the justification for targeting of individuals from specific racial and ethnic 
backgrounds seen as a particular threat and the trust in procedural justice on the part of certain 
members of these communities having broken down.   
Profiling a suspect community  
The security regime at airports is characterised by two opposing explanatory models. The first 
approach is based on consent, procedural justice and providing security for all travelling 
through ports.  The second is based on identifying risk on pre-determined characteristics of 
individuals and targeting by way of profiling that characteristic.  There is a distinct tension 
between these two practices. Parallels from policing the terrorist threat in both Northern Ireland 
and post 9/11 on the UK mainland can be drawn because of the similar sectarian 
characteristics of these conflicts.48 Hillyard in his 1993 study of Irish communities during the 
Troubles suggested that counter–terrorism policies had created mistrust towards the police 
and army.49  The danger of lumping communities into a broad category of a potential terrorist 
threat because they may express the mildest concerns about government policy can result in 
castigating everyone in that community, consequently losing the goodwill of many within it.50 
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Chakraborti suggests generalising about the beliefs existing within communities can itself be 
misleading without understating the diversity of backgrounds within that community.51  
Counter-terrorism strategies, if poorly applied, can increase the terrorist threat rather than 
counter it by propagating more support from minorities in those communities.52 Pantazis and 
Pemberton suggest that it can even prolong conflicts.53 
There have been a number of studies that have focused on UK airport security and the use of 
Schedule 7 and its effects on minorities, particularly Muslims.  A study by Hurrell analysed the 
use of Schedule 7 from 2010 to 2013 to determine whether it is applied more frequently to 
ethnic minorities.54 She found;  
The experimental analysis of race disproportionality suggests that both black and 
Asian or other ethnic groups experienced high race disproportionality in 2010/11, 
which was higher for examinations at airports than for those at all ports. Overall, race 
disproportionality was high for total examinations, higher for over the hour 
examinations and highest for detentions.55  
Although there has been a large reduction in recorded Schedule 7 stops since 2010, Hurrell 
identifies that ethnic groups are still more likely to be stopped using Schedule 7 than white 
British passengers.56 
Langley has reviewed the passenger experience of policing and Schedule 7 by contrasting 
two approaches. The first, the procedural justice model, based on legitimacy of the actions.  
The second, the experienced utility model associated with ‘happy endings’, the positive 
influence that this emotion can have on memories of experiences.57 This model is essentially 
Kahnerman’s twist on Jeremey Bentham’s concept of utility. Kahnerman suggests two key 
foundations of experienced utility; ‘moment utility’ which refers to the experienced utility of an 
episode in real time and ‘remembered utility’ which relates to retrospective “global evaluations” 
of previous incidents in life. In these instances, pleasure and pain can be measured or as 
Kahnerman suggests they are ‘peak and end’ moments in which experience can be 
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assessed.58 Langley found that passengers who had been stopped by security responded 
more positively to the procedural justice model that treated passengers with dignity and 
deemed legitimate. 
Choudhury and Fenwick reviewed Schedule 7’s impact as well as other terrorist legislation on 
the Muslim community.59  They found that the way in which terrorism legislation was being 
applied affected more negatively on non-white respondents. Additionally, Blackwell and others 
carried out individual and group interviews with 38 Scottish Muslims concerning their 
encounters with authority, especially at British airports.60  This project did not review Schedule 
7 specifically but found that relationships between minorities and the police have often been 
difficult, which has resulted in creating mistrust between the Muslim community and authority 
bodies, particularly the police.  Their findings found negative encounters at airports with the 
authorities based on their respondents’ perception of being Muslim.   
All of these studies raise issues of policing ethnic minorities at airports, particularly the 
apparent negative effects on the Muslim community and their willingness to cooperate and 
negative attitudes to being questioned by security.  Research in other jurisdictions support 
these findings including one focusing on the experiences of passengers at an airport in Tel 
Aviv.  As distinct to the U.K., a formal policy of racial profiling is in place.  Responses to a 
series of questions provided that Israeli Arab passengers (overwhelmingly Muslim) compared 
with Israeli Jewish passengers, had significantly higher levels of agreement that they were 
treated differently, felt humiliated, and felt intimidated.61 In an additional study of 1970 
passengers at the Ben-Gurion airport in Israel, Perry and Hasisi suggested ethnic minorities 
are perceived as posing a potential threat to homeland security, often referred to as “suspect 
communities.” Passengers from suspect communities are subject to rigorous screening, but 
are also regarded as a source of information, making their cooperation even more important 
than that of other passengers.  The project suggested that passengers belonging to the 
suspect community of Israeli Muslims were less willing to cooperate with security procedures 
than all other passengers. However, when controlling for passengers’ perceptions of 
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legitimacy and procedural justice, Israeli Muslims were more willing to cooperate with airport 
security than Israeli Jews.62   
It is useful to also briefly review profiling at U.S. airports because it was the first western 
country to try to establish a programme to profile for potential terrorists’ post 9/11. In October 
2003, the U.S. Transport Security Association (TSA) piloted in three airports, a programme 
called Screening of Passengers by Observations Techniques (SPOT) carried out by 
Behaviour Detection Officers (BDO).63  The U.S. Government Accountability Office’s (GAO) 
report suggested that SPOT, was carried out without any scientific basis, and questioned the 
programme’s reliability.64 The TSA responded by identifying that no other programme of this 
nature had ever been scientifically assessed prior to implementation.65  The GAO 
acknowledged the difficulties in measuring the success of such a programme because profiling 
passengers is not based on science but on the judgements of individual security staff, which 
can at times be unreliable and create inconsistencies. Nevertheless, despite concerns, in 2007 
the programme was implemented in 42 airports, employing 644 BDO officers.  By 2012, the 
programme had increased staffing to more than 2,800 at 142 airports.66  No terrorist has been 
caught at an airport because of the SPOT programme, despite 199 arrests for other crimes.67 
In 2013, the SPOT programme was reviewed as lacking a clear strategic plan to identify 
priorities and establish clear outcomes, by which time costs had increased to $878 million.68 
A report sent to the GAO recommended that future funding for the SPOT programme needed 
to be limited.69 The training of officers for the programme, particularly the refresher courses, 
were identified as ineffective,70 questioning the professionalism of officers in stopping 
passengers and running a real risk of ethnic profiling.  The conclusion is that a programme 
which had grown out of 9/11 for very good reasons has more than a decade later become 
dysfunctional and lacking in purpose.   
This examination of studies which suggest a practice of racial profiling at airports, is within the 
context that there is a significant body of evidence to establish that racial profiling by the police 
both in the U.S. and U.K. has been in existence before 9/11,71 and is clearly not limited to 
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airports or ports.72 It is a symptom of wider societal issues. Pre 9/11 research in the U.S. had 
shown that the media had helped to construct and conflate the interconnected racial 
stereotypes and social realities of crime and justice with images of crime and race. Afro-
American males have been aligned to crime and consequently influencing police 
presumptions of culpability.73 Similarly in the U.K., acts of terrorism in recent years have seen 
the media focus on the Muslim community.  A useful comparison has been made between the 
recent targeting of young Muslim males and that of young Catholic males during the ‘Troubles’ 
in Northern Ireland.  Both the Irish Catholic and Muslim communities have been labelled as 
suspect and worthy of greater attention.74 In addition and interconnected is the process of 
stereotyping with ‘institutional racism’ within police organisations identified.75  This was a main 
conclusion of the 1999 Macpherson Report concerning the murder of Stephen Lawrence and 
the role of the Metropolitan Police.76   
Canter suggests offender profiling is generally known as the derivation of inferences about a 
criminal from aspects of the crime(s).77 Therefore, identifying passengers at airports as 
suspected terrorists can only be described as a ‘type’ of profiling because of the limited 
information that security officials have on any individual. Welch submits that the perceptions 
about the presumed racial identity of criminals may be so ingrained in the public 
consciousness that race does not even need to be mentioned for a connection to be made.78 
Media reporting about many types of crime and terrorist attacks has become synonymous with 
race.79  It is important to reiterate that racial or ethnic profiling in the UK is illegal, to do so 
would constitute direct discrimination under section 13 of the Equality Act 2010. Profiling 
passengers solely on the grounds of ethnicity could also amount to racial harassment under 
section 26 of the Act, where a person feels ‘humiliated, offended or degraded because of their 
race’.  The potential consequence is that these experiences of individuals produces a negative 
view of policing, which can contribute to the radicalisation of individuals and entrenching social 
divides.80 This is particularly so when one considers the overwhelming numbers of Muslim 
airline passengers who have nothing to do with terrorism even though they might fit a particular 
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profile.81 As previously mentioned, the 2014 Code of Practice governing Schedule 7 
specifically does not allow ethnicity to be the only reason for stopping someone but, once 
stopped, a person can be questioned about their religious beliefs and activities within their 
religious communities. Once officers open this line of questioning, it is questionable whether 
this could be ‘legitimate’ under the procedural justice model.  There have been many other 
modelling programmes to suggest that passengers could be assigned to a certain class of 
security check without racially profiling passengers, for example by the age of passengers or 
pre-approved screening passengers who could then be fast tracked at security. 
Schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act 2000, could be described more accurately as a development 
from dealing with the ‘Troubles’ in Northern Ireland under the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act 1984 & 1989 Schedule 5 rather than a response to 9/11.  Schedule 
7 cannot be described as an instrument that was designed to facilitate profiling, nevertheless 
it can support those who believe they have profiled a suspected passenger. 
To conclude this section, there appears therefore to be tension between these studies that 
provides evidence of feelings of discriminatory policing within the Muslim community and of 
racial profiling at airports compared to the view of Anderson that Schedule 7 is not being 
exercised in a discriminatory way.82  This study was designed to partly test whether there is 
evidence of racial profiling based on the experiences of the respondents in the target group. 
 
The Survey of Young Passengers’ Perceptions of Security 
In the context of studies carried in the UK and negative perceptions of UK policing and use of 
Schedule 7 as well as passenger satisfaction surveys carried out by the CAA, the following 
hypotheses were tested in this study. 
1. Passengers are reassured of high levels of security at UK airports (𝐻0null) 




3. Age is not a factor in the time it takes to go through UK airport security. (𝐻0null) 
 
The questions specifically related to security staff professionalism when stopped (actual 
experience) and questions relating to respondent opinion of profiling and discrimination 
towards non-white ethnic passengers (their opinions). The hypotheses relate to all security 
staff who check passengers prior to electronic screening and post screening when the police 
may carry out Schedule 7 questioning. The term ‘stopped’ in this research includes when 
passengers leaving the UK have had their hand luggage or they have themselves triggered 
an alarm that warrants further screening, questioning and possible confiscation. It also 
includes when entering the UK, passport and customs checks that have warranted further 
search or investigation.  The purpose of including these variables was to gain as much 
information from respondents’ personal aviation security interactions and whether age had 
any relevance to security. This can be seen from the high level of stops (287 from 711 
respondents).  In addition, respondents could reflect on several flights, because often 
passengers have no interaction to speak of going through security but will remember the 
incidents they do for example when an item is confiscated.  The total flight experiences 
recorded from 711 respondents was 3952 which suggests they had a 14% chance of a security 
stop.  This relatively high percentage of stops is explained later when reviewing the third 
hypothesis of whether age impacted of the time it takes to process passengers through 
security. The majority of the respondents had used local airports, 64% from Manchester and 
Leeds Bradford airports.   
The focus of this study is on a community of respondents (students) registered at Leeds 
Beckett University (LBU). 711 students were surveyed from 2012 to 2015 to consider their 
experiences and attitudes towards security at UK airports. The rationale for the data subject 
was that since 9/11 a large number of UK university students have either carried out terrorist 
attacks or supported such causes. Since the destruction of the Isis Caliphate in Syria in 2019, 
interviews with UK Isis fighters in Kurdish camps have revealed the high number of former 
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university students.83  Universities have been recognised as a source for the radicalisation of 
vulnerable students and have consequently been targeted in counter-terrorism measures.84 
The Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015 (CTSA 2015) Schedule 6 imposes duties on 
specified authorities, such as universities to establish the ‘Prevent’ policy and to actively 
engage where students might be radicalised and drawn into terrorism.85   
The sample size of 711 in this study needs to be understood in the context of total passenger 
numbers.  In 2015, around 251 million passengers used UK airports.86 In 2030 there are 
expected to be more than 400 million passengers using UK airports each year.87 These 
statistics might suggest that the sample size to test UK airport passenger security experience 
should be high to ensure a high degree of reliability of this or any research into aviation 
security.  This sample size can also be compared with the passenger satisfaction surveys 
carried out by the CA since 2008, The CAA use a sample size (cumulatively) of around 20,000 
respondents from several airports to measure passenger experience, which includes their 
experience of security. In the CAA survey four questions focus on passenger security 
experience.88 By targeting certain airports the CAA are narrowing the total possible passenger 
population and allowing a lower sample size to establish viable data sample for an overall 
assessment.89 The CAA had categorised their respondents by age groups and had asked their 
respondents how long the security process had taken.  The data had shown younger 
passenger groups do take longer to be processed than older passenger groups, particularly 
at Stansted Airport. Similar questions were asked in this study, but with a view of cross-
referencing CAA data and establishing if this study concurred similar time process and more 
importantly where the CAA data was lacking, whether there could be an explanation for this. 
The majority of respondents in this study were aged between 18-25; actual age was not 
requested because of the presumption that the majority of the sample would be young.  There 
is likely to be a higher use of regional airports such as Leeds Bradford and Manchester due to 
the location of LBU. The respondents had used all major UK airports.90 The police and security 
personnel at airports are tasked with screening luggage as well as profiling passengers to 
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consider whether they are worthy of further questioning.  Suspicion is likely to result in the use 
of Schedule 7 TA 2000 to determine whether they are a terrorist.  
Ethnicity in this project is described as white or non-white. The original categories of ethnicity 
consisted of three white groupings which accounted for 61.9% of total ethnicity and fourteen 
non-white (39.1%), of which many groups had low numbers, for example, Chinese accounted 
for one respondent. Table 1 below sets out the 17 possible ethnic options respondents could 
select.  The data set was recoded from this large list of ethnic backgrounds and divided into 




Table 1 Ethnicity 
 
   Ethnicity Frequency % Cumulative % 
 
White British 417 58.6 58.6 
White Irish 2 .3 58.9 
Other white 21 3.0 61.9 
Asian or Asian British 
Indian 
19 2.7 64.6 
Asian or Asian British 
Pakistani 
127 17.9 82.4 
Asian or Asian British 
Bangladeshi 
11 1.5 84.0 
Chinese 1 .1 84.1 
Other Asian 18 2.5 86.6 
Black or Black British 
Caribbean 
10 1.4 88.0 
Black or Black British 
African 
44 6.2 94.2 
Other Black 6 .8 95.1 
Mixed White and Black 
Caribbean 
12 1.7 96.8 
Mixed White and Black 
African 
5 .7 97.5 
Mixed White and Asian 5 .7 98.2 
Other mixed 6 .8 99.0 
Other ethnicity 5 .7 99.7 
No response 2 .3 100.0 











White includes British, Irish and other which cumulatively accounts for 61.9% of all 
respondents.  The ethnicity in the LBU Law School during the four years of this sample for 
non-whites i.e. all categorised other white in Table 1 averaged at 39.75%. Further analysis of 
profiling questions used cross-tabulation analysis to enable more variables to be assessed 
such as sex, and further recoding of ethnicity into wider-ranging groupings. The recoded ethnic 
groups for the cross-tabulation analysis were white, South Asian, black and other (see Tables 
3-6).  The largest non-white ethnicity group was Asian or Asian British Pakistani which 
accounted for 127 respondents or 17.9%.  No religious data was gathered but an assumption 
can be made that this category would contain many Muslim respondents. The ethnicity of this 
data sample was measured against the university monitoring data over the four years of the 
survey and confirmed that the ethnicity and sex in the survey was representative of the 
university population during this time. 
Questions and Findings 
The following presentation of findings concerns the hypothesis 2, i.e. airport security applies 
risk assessment equally to all passengers in UK airports (𝐻0null). In this series of questions 
relating to profiling passengers, respondents were required to indicate whether they agree or 
disagree with the statement made. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or 
disagreed that profiling gives an opportunity for security to harass ethnic minorities.  Table 2 
shows the overwhelming majority of respondents (605 or 85%) disagree that profiling gives 
an opportunity to harass ethnic minorities, differences in proportions of white and non-white 
who disagree are observed.  
Table 2: Do you agree or disagree that profiling gives an opportunity for security to harass ethnic 
minorities?   
 Profiling gives an 
opportunity for security to 
harass ethnic minorities 
Total 
Disagree Agree 
White and Non-white 
categories 
White 410 30 440 
Non-
white 
195 74 269 
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Total 605 104 709 
 
 A Chi-square test was carried out to see if these differences were significant.  The expected 
count in all cells was five or more so the test is valid. Therefore, the 𝐻0 from this example 
could be rejected and consequently, risk assessment does not apply equally to all passengers 
in the opinion of these respondents.  
Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed whether airport security 
legitimises discrimination against ethnic minorities. Table 3 shows the overwhelming majority 
of respondents (676 or 95%) disagree that airport security legitimises discrimination against 
ethnic minorities, however differences in the proportion of white and non-white who disagree 
are observed. 
Table 3:   Do you agree or disagree that Airport security legitimises discrimination 
against ethnic minorities? 





White and Non-white 
categories 
White 428 12 440 
Non-
white 
248 21 269 
Total 676 33 709 
 
 A Chi-square test was carried out to see if these differences were significant.  The expected 
count in all cells was five or more so the test is valid.  Therefore, from this example the 𝐻0 
would be rejected and risk assessment does not apply equally to all passengers in the opinion 
of these respondents.  
The Chi-square test in both of the above examples shows a minority of respondents did agree 
that airport security discriminates and is an opportunity to harass minorities. There is a 
significant difference from white and non-white respondents relating to their perceptions of 
airport security rather than their actual experiences. Although from this data ethnic minorities 
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might assume that if stopped, the reason is related to their ethnicity rather than anything else. 
Legitimacy of stopping passengers remains important for these reasons, particularly the 
professionalism of security in rationalising the stop.   
A number of provocative question were asked of the respondents to try to test whether profiling 
terrorists is realistic on the basis of observation alone.  For example, it is obvious who terrorists 
are simply by their appearance. Table 4 shows overwhelming disagreement from both male 
75.2% (200) and female 81.9% (363) respondents with the idea that it is obvious who terrorists 
are simply by their appearance.  
Table 4: Do you agree or disagree that profiling is a good idea because it is obvious 
who the terrorists are? 
 
 
The number of male and female respondents who agree with the statement, although low, are 
relevant.  This is evidence of potential discriminatory attitudes amongst the respondents.  It is 
impossible to specifically determine whether someone is a terrorist from observation only, 
unless they are in the process of carrying out a terrorist attack or found to be carrying weapons 
and explosive. Of those respondents who suggested that terrorists can be identified by 
observation 80 were female, and 65% were white British. However, of the 66 male 
respondents only 43.9% were white British suggesting an ethnic and gender difference in 
attitudes towards observation.  However, a greater proportion of men (33%) than women 
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terrorists are. It is interesting from this data that more male non-white ethnic respondents 
believe they can determine terrorist by observation alone.  
The majority of females (82.4%) and males (64.3%) agree that profiling gives an opportunity 
to target passengers acting suspiciously.  Table 5 shows those respondents who disagree 
with this question a higher proportion were male Asian, black and other.  There is also a 
difference in gender opinions for respondents who disagree with the question with 35.7% male 
and 17.6% female.  This data could suggest ethnic males view profiling in general more 
suspiciously than females. 




Table 6 shows there is an overwhelming disagreement with the idea that ethnic minorities 
should be subject to higher security checks with 709 respondents suggesting that all 
passengers should be profiled in the same manner.  
Table 6: Do you Agree or Disagree that ethnic minorities should be subject to higher 
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 It could be suggested that this data shows that ethnicity should never be a reason to suspect 
someone of either being involved with a crime or terrorism.  However, there must always be 
an opportunity for security staff to question passengers who are acting suspiciously.  
 
Measuring perception with experience 
A minority of non-white respondents in this study perceived that some elements of security 
process was discriminatory to ethnic minorities and could be interpreted as evidence for racial 
profiling.  However, this should be seen in the context that others parts of this study identified 
that respondents were generally stopped because they had triggered electronic screening 
resulting in 187 confiscated items. Table 7 outlines those items 
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This study also established that that younger passengers take longer to proceed through 
security and this confirms CAA data measuring the time it takes passengers, by age group, to 
proceed through UK airport security. The CAA data has no explanation why this might be.  
This study suggests that delay in security processes may be due to the fact that younger 
passengers pay less attention to prohibited items consequently increasing the interactions 
with security who are required to search hand luggage and ask further questions if something 
has been detected. These passenger interactions with security personnel could increase the 
perception of a lack of legitimacy in cases where passengers fail to comply with security rules, 
for example liquids in one clear plastic bag that do not exceed 100ml.  This is an alternative 
account to the proposition that lack of legitimacy of the security process is due to a perception 
of racial profiling of ethnic minorities.  
The airport security process concerning embarkation has become increasingly lengthy and 
intrusive. Its legitimacy is established by the public perception that this process embodies 
procedural justice.  Airports face competing pressures to be commercially viable on the one 
hand and fulfil a duty of care to passenger safety and ensure compliance with regulatory 
requirements. On the other hand, a key question is what is the evidence that the current 
security process is fit for purpose and indeed should there be a radical re-think as to the 
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effectiveness of screening processes at airports. Linos et al have questioned whether the 
existing process at airports would pass the National Screening Committee’s criteria for an 
effective screening test.92 Initiated in the National Health Service in the 1990s, the National 
Screening Committee has a “remit is to assess screening technologies on the basis of sound 
scientific evidence and advise on whether they should be implemented, continued, or 
withdrawn.”93 Further, Linos et al suggest that an analogous approach should be adopted to 
current airport security screening as “ the first step to building a future airport security 
programme that is more user friendly and cost effective, and that ultimately protects 
passengers from realistic threats”.94 
Concluding Discussion and Suggested Reforms 
Does the data produced in this study corroborate or challenge other research findings around 
the existence of racial profiling in UK policing at airports?    In all of the survey questions and 
open comments, respondents were positive about security and appeared to implicitly be 
supporting the legitimacy of this approach of re-assurance policing based on procedural 
justice. Respondents overwhelmingly rejected questions that suggested ethnic minorities 
should be treated differently to white passengers.  Indeed, as mentioned in the data analysis 
of this hypothesis, for the question, ‘only ethnic minorities should be subject to higher level 
checks’ (see Table 6), only three respondents agreed with this statement and 700 disagreed.  
Nevertheless, other questions that were asked relating to profiling showed that whilst there 
was support for the existing security measures at UK airports, there was a significant 
difference of opinion between white and non-white respondents.  Although the overwhelming 
majority of respondents in the study who had been stopped (287 or 92%) agree that they were 
dealt with professionally, differences in proportions of white and non-white who disagree are 
observed. The perception of airport security is important particularly when security staff are 
reliant upon passengers to be both corporative and willing to report suspicious behaviour.   
This study confirms the findings of other research detailed above insofar that in a minority of 
non-white passengers have concerns in the way they are treated at airports in the UK.  This 
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perception of profiling cannot be interpreted as providing evidence of a practice of racial 
profiling however.  
This study revealed that young passengers are more likely to have an impact on the time it 
takes to process them through security due to what appeared to be a casual approach to 
prohibited items allowed in the aircraft cabin.  Therefore to save time processing passenger 
through security one aspect of profiling should be concentrated on young passengers before 
entering the security zones.  This study also confirms the findings of other social science 
research that non-white passengers have concerns about the way they are treated at airports 
in the UK. However, the public consciousness, particularly on non-white passengers as Welch 
suggests,95 may influence their perceptions about their racial identity through media reporting 
about crime or terrorist attacks which leads them to conclude when they have been stopped 
or items confiscated due to their racial identity. However, it cannot be overstated that overall 
the respondents, including those from ethnic minority backgrounds, are supportive of high 
levels of security. Nevertheless, there are a number of practical measures such as monitoring 
passenger satisfaction and by providing quick routes of feedback by passengers of their 
experience to ensure those carrying out any screening can respond quickly and professionally. 
The data suggests that further training of security officials and the police embedding 
procedural justice could alleviate non-white passenger concerns about their perceived ideas 
of police selecting passengers on the grounds of their ethnicity.   
It is very unlikely that when passengers are initially stopped they will be informed that the 
authority to stop and question them is under Schedule 7, its purpose to determine whether 
they are a terrorist. Indeed, to do so could cause alarm. In most cases, passengers are allowed 
to go on their way.  Schedule 7 remains a powerful tool to stop, search and detain passengers, 
without any need for reasonable suspicion but with a view to determining whether they are 
terrorists.  Tensions within the Muslim communities who feel that they are treated differently 
and as being ‘other’, are likely to continue, exacerbated by new legal developments designed 
to strengthen detection and prevention of British Nationals going to fight abroad in places such 
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as Syria. The introduction of measures in the Counter-Terrorism and Security Act 2015, it is 
argued is likely to have focused disproportionally on Muslim passengers at airports.96 
The public review of Schedule 7 in 2012 was a lost opportunity to impose robust safeguards 
for persons detained 15 minutes or more, which would strike a balance between flexibility and 
requiring officers to have reasonable suspicion to detain persons for longer than 15 minutes.97 
Data suggests that most passengers travelling are detained for no more than a few minutes.98 
There appears to be some logic and a need for a flexible approach to stop passengers and all 
passengers that are stopped are subject to a number of standard checks. Schedule 7 can thus 
be justified as a necessary and proportionate safeguard.  Examining officers who cannot 
articulate to passengers why they are being detained for fifteen minutes or more should forfeit 
any right to detain passengers. Additionally, it is difficult to understand at this point why any 
further detention would be necessary without reasonable suspicion.  Striking a balance 
between security and civil liberties against a backdrop of actual and attempted aviation attacks 
is about effective risk assessment and sensitive practices.99 However, identifying particular 
profile indicators for examination, such as flight routes need to be balanced with the fact that 
the overwhelming majority of passengers do not pose any risk to aviation security.  It is clear 
from the 2017 UK terrorist events and the introduction of the Counter-Terrorism and Border 
Security Act 2019 that the UK is determined to continue to broaden its powers against 
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